While it can be said that Webb's role in Tokyo was judicial (rather than non-judicial) in nature, it is dealt with in this essay on the basis that it was off-court war-related work that did not involve the exercise of conventional domestic judicial authority. 10 It can be argued that the High Court in this period was not truly an 'apex' court since its decisions in non-constitutional matters were still subject to appeal to the Privy Council. However, it is submitted that the Court's role as the final court of appeal in most constitutional cases and as the highest court located in Australia makes the 'top' court 2010
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United States for two years between 1942-44. Prior to his departure for Washington, his duties on the Central Wool Committee and other wartime executive bodies occupied much of his working time. 11 Secondly, the 'special' nature of this extrajudicial activity flows from the character of many of the tasks themselves and the extent to which they diverged from the normal work of the courts. This is exemplified by Latham and Dixon's diplomatic appointments which, in a fundamental departure from ordinary standards of judicial autonomy, placed both men at the heart of the executive branch. Thirdly, and again contrary to normal practice, Latham and Dixon, at various times during the war, spontaneously volunteered their extra-judicial services to government. On the outbreak of World War II, Dixon immediately asked Prime Minister Menzies how he (Dixon) could help, an offer Dixon repeated to the Prime Minister on several occasions. 12 As this essay shows, Sir John Latham volunteered, in dramatic fashion, for a share of extra-judicial activity as well.
Of course, one of our basic tenets of government is that judges, especially the most senior members of the judiciary, must not be part of the executive. The principles of judicial independence and separation of powers -whether considered as aspects of our common law inheritance or part of Chapter III of the Australian Constitutionnecessitate that the judiciary stand apart from the other branches of government. 13 The reasons for this segregation are clear. It promotes public confidence in judicial impartiality, especially in cases involving government or persons associated with, or opposed to, government interests. The separation of the judiciary from the legislature and executive also allows the judiciary to subject the government to legal control and ensure that the rule of law is upheld. 14 Yet during World War II, the judiciary's separation from the other branches of government was significantly abridged as key members of the High Court were seconded into executive service. As Gleeson has remarked: '[p]lainly, in all but extraordinary circumstances' such a situation 'would not be contemplated'. 15 Against this backdrop, this essay explores the extent to which war justifies 'special cases' of extra-judicial service by High Court judges. It does so by focusing on a remarkable exchange of correspondence between Chief Justice Sir John Latham and Prime Minister Menzies in June 1940. 16 In that correspondence, discussed in the section that follows, Latham proposed to Menzies that, as Chief Justice, he should play a truly extraordinary extra-judicial part in government decision-making in the event that the nation's worst fears of defeat in Europe were realised. The role that Latham envisaged for himself did not, as events transpired, come about. Nonetheless, it raises intriguing questions, considered in later sections of this essay, about the extent to which wartime _____________________________________________________________________________________ description apposite for present purposes. On any view, the High Court has always occupied a position of leadership in the Australian judicial hierarchy. 11 Ayres, above n 4, ch 7 (esp 125-6, 129, 132, 134).
12
Ibid 115-17, 120. Latham sent Menzies an extract from Dick's letter. In his own letter, he went straight to the point. If a German controlled British Government were to seek Australia's support, wrote Latham senior, then my son's suggestion that Australia should consider shifting her allegiance from Britain to a bond with the United States 'would probably be the best course'. To canvass this possibility was not to be 'defeatist', he assured Menzies, but rather to make ready in case crisis should befall. Having proffered this radical advice to the Prime Minister -itself a questionable extension of the judicial role -the Chief Justice did not retreat, but, remarkably, ventured further into the political domain. If Australia were forced to reconsider her allegiance to Britain, continued Latham, then the Chief Justice, along with the Governor-General, could potentially play a part in the government's deliberations. Specifically, Latham proposed that the government consider associating both himself and the GovernorGeneral:
openly and personally with the Cabinet in the consideration of the question before a decision is actually reached.
By this Latham seems to have been contemplating that, as Chief Justice, he would help Cabinet make the fateful decision whether to repudiate a proxy German Government in Britain. Thus '[i]n normal times', conceded Latham, the idea that the Chief Justice 'would have any share' in such a decision 'would be quite out of place'. 21 That these were not normal times is evident from Menzies' response to the Chief Justice. In a brief letter sent two days later, Menzies thanked Latham for his suggestion about confederation with the United States and hinted vaguely at government planning for a range of contingencies were Britain to be defeated. On the idea of a role for the Chief Justice in deliberations over a possible break with Britain, however, Menzies was clear, specifically endorsing Latham's view on 'the value of associating … the Chief Justice in the consideration of the question'. 22 Potentially, at his own initiative, and with the imprimatur of the Prime Minister, Latham was parachuting into the work of Cabinet. 
III 'SPECIAL' NATURE OF HIGH COURT EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITY DURING WAR
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In particular, the fall of Britain exchange, when examined in further detail, serves to illuminate each of the three 'special' features of the record of wartime extra-judicial service by High Court judges outlined above: the volume of that activity, its proximity to core executive functions and the element of judicial volunteerism. This is especially so when account is taken of several other behind-the-scenes contacts, discussed below, that also took place between Latham and Menzies at this time.
A
Volume of extra-judicial activity In considering the volume of extra-judicial activity undertaken by members of the High Court during World War II, the first thing to note is that Latham's act of tendering policy advice to the Prime Minister on events in Europe -even leaving aside the role envisaged for himself in that advice -itself took the Chief Justice outside the judicial domain. It is well-known that Latham, while Chief Justice, frequently volunteered his opinion on a range of policy matters to political figures, including federal government ministers. 23 He did this before, during and after the war. 24 This practice, whatever might be said about its propriety, which was surely open to question, 25 was not without parallel at the time. In the United States, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter maintained a close advisory relationship with President Franklin Roosevelt that pre-dated the United States' entry into the war. 26 Nearer to home, Dixon, in the early years of the war advised a variety of people associated with government, including Prime Minister Menzies, on war-related issues. 27 After the war, Dixon did not eschew behind-the-scenes government advising entirely, though his involvement in the practice was more limited. 28 32 The extent to which Latham's energies were directed towards extra-judicial matters in this period is further highlighted by the fact that Latham's proposal that he participate in Cabinet's discussions over Australia's fealty to a German controlled Britain, and Menzies' agreement to this, came only days before Menzies formally asked Latham to become Australia's first Minister to Japan. Indeed, at one point, Latham seems to have regarded himself as faced with a choice between the two roles. By mid-1940, the opening of an Australian mission in Japan had been under discussion for some time. 33 Latham was one of a small number of prominent Australians with an established interest in Japan and was frequently mentioned as a possible envoy. 34 In particular, in 1934, while still in Parliament, Latham had visited Japan as the leader of an official Australian goodwill mission. There he had met the Emperor and many senior politicians and business people. 35 36 In all probability, by June 1940, Latham had long been expecting that this difficult and sensitive task -Japan and the Allies were not yet at war -could be his.
However, when on 27 June 1940 Menzies finally offered Latham the Tokyo position, Latham declined. As the offer was first put to him, the appointment was for five years and would involve his resignation from the High Court, a step Latham was reluctant to take in uncertain times. 37 Thus he wrote to Menzies thanking the government for the honour of asking him to go to Japan, but, in an apparent reference to their remarkable exchange just a week earlier, suggested that his talents might best be deployed on the home front. '[I]n certain contingencies', Latham told Menzies, 'I may be able to serve … better in Australia'. 38 Yet, shortly after writing this, Latham agreed to accept the position in Japan and thereby to forego any putative domestic role. In a turnaround, the government now indicated that it was prepared, exceptionally, for Latham to take leave from the High Court to embark on his diplomatic venture. 39 The appointment was made public on 18 August 1940. Latham's leave of absence from the High Court commenced on 12 November 1940, the day he departed for Japan. 40 Clearly, however, this alternative course did not avert the separation of powers problems presented by the fall of Britain arrangements. Rather, Latham simply 'parachuted into' executive service on another front. In so doing, he paved the way for Dixon's later appointment as wartime Minister to the United States and set a precedent for McTiernan and Webb's subsequent war-related off-court work as well.
B
Proximity of extra-judicial activity to the Executive The second 'special' feature of the extra-judicial activity undertaken by members of the High Court during World War II was the proximity of much of that work to the heartland of executive power and, correspondingly, its distance from ordinary judicial work. Modern Australian case law on extra-judicial service by federal judges draws a distinction between non-judicial functions performed independently of the legislature and executive as opposed to those in which a judge is absorbed, in actuality or appearance, into government itself. The former category is illustrated by the continuing practice of individual Federal Court judges sitting as members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 41 Wilson's Case (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17-18 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). ____________________________________________________________________________________ embedded within the executive itself, serving, for example, as a government adviser. 42 In terms of the consistency of extra-judicial service with judicial independence and separation of powers, functions, like those of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that are performed openly, impartially and at arms length from government, are much more likely, for obvious reasons, to pass constitutional muster than those that are not. 43 Viewed from this perspective, the dealings between Latham and Menzies in mid-1940 show how far the war had broken down the wall of separation between the judiciary and the executive. It had long been settled in England and Australia that it was fundamentally inconsistent with judicial independence for a serving judge to hold ministerial office and to sit in Cabinet. 44 Now Latham was contemplating joining Cabinet's deliberations over one of the most difficult decisions Australia as a nation would have to face. A move further into the heart of the political affairs of the nation is hard to imagine. Latham's concession in his letter to Menzies that '[i]n normal times', his participation in such a major government decision 'would be quite out of place', was an understatement, to say the least.
Latham and Dixon's diplomatic appointments, as well as Dixon's extensive wartime committee responsibilities, show that involvement by Australia's top judges in functions at the centre of executive power was not simply canvassed during the war, but became reality. Focusing on Latham's role as envoy to Japan, 45 his acceptance of that office transformed the Chief Justice into a senior agent of the Australian Government abroad. In that capacity, Latham was subject to the direction of the Minister for External Affairs, initially Sir Frederick Stewart and later, in a bizarre twist of fate, Latham's former High Court colleague, Dr H V Evatt. 46 As Minister to Japan, Latham necessarily provided high level policy advice to the government. 47 Indeed, it has been said that in the outpost of Tokyo -far removed from the small and overstretched Department of External Affairs in Canberra -Latham 'virtually dictated his own policy'. 48 For an account of Dixon's wartime committee work and his role as Minister to the United States, see Ayres, above n 4, chs 7-8. 46 Edwards, above n 33, 193.
47
In addition, prior to the commencement of Latham's High Court leave, it seems that, as ambassador-in-waiting, he attended at least one federal Cabinet meeting. See Ayres, above n 4, 124 recording a diary entry by Dixon for 1 October 1940: 'Tea with Latham who came from the Cabinet: sd (1) Menzies thought he was beaten. (2) All in fear of Japan … The Jap. treaty with Germany meant that she believed that we were beaten.' As Ayres notes, the reference to Menzies thinking he 'was beaten' relates to the then uncertain result of the September 1940 election.
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ and acknowledging his government's 'dependence on your information and guidance'. 49 The secret government inquiry undertaken by Justice McTiernan into the integrity of the materials used to construct Australia's Beaufort Bombers also deserves mention in this context. As already noted, a censorship ban prevented the press from reporting on the inquiry and McTiernan's findings, delivered to Attorney-General Evatt, 50 were suppressed. Even after the war, Cabinet specifically decided not to 54 Assuming that the inquiry followed quasi-judicial procedures, however, it was necessarily closer to the ordinary judicial function than Latham and Dixon's tasks. 55 
C
Judicial volunteerism for extra-judicial work A third 'special' feature of the extra-judicial work undertaken by members of the High Court during World War II is the fact that certain judges -Latham, Dixon and, in somewhat different circumstances, Webb -directly volunteered their services to government. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the judiciary as a branch of government is the long-established principle that, save in special circumstances, judges do not initiate their own work, but rather hear and decide cases brought before them Wilson's Case (1996) 189 CLR 1, 17. I am grateful to Sir Anthony Mason for a helpful discussion on this issue. ____________________________________________________________________________________ by others. As Alexander Hamilton famously said, the judiciary has 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever'. 56 It is widely accepted today that if the executive seeks a judge for an extrajudicial purpose it should, in the first instance, discuss the matter with the relevant Chief Justice. In particular, to avoid any suggestion of executive favouritism or partiality, government officials should not make direct overtures to an individual judge. 57 The converse -for judges to take the 'active resolution' of contacting the executive to offer their services -runs contrary to conventional notions of judicial detachment.
Yet, as indicated above, Latham, Dixon and Webb each specifically volunteered for wartime extra-judicial service. In the case of the Latham-Menzies fall of Britain exchange, Latham did far more than this -he actually suggested the exceptional function that he should discharge. Latham's friendship with Menzies may have encouraged him to make this offer, but this is not the only explanation for Latham's conduct. After his resignation as Minister to Japan on 31 December 1941 -a decision that followed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor earlier that month -Latham signalled to Prime Minister Curtin his willingness to do further off-court work. Thus Latham told Curtin that he was available for 'any service anywhere which you think that I can usefully give'. 58 Likewise, following the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939, Dixon told Prime Minister Menzies of his willingness 'to do anything … for the war'. 59 Dixon had no qualms about the propriety of his offer, repeating it on several occasions and also letting it be known in the press at the time of his appointment, by the Curtin Government, as Minister to the United States. 60 Sir William Webb, by contrast, was not appointed to the High Court until 1946 by which time he was already engaged in the Tokyo war crime trials. However, in the early stages of the war, while still Chief Justice of Queensland, Webb wrote to Prime Minister Menzies 'offering to serve anywhere in the World during the War'. 61 Webb later undertook substantial extra-judicial wartime work for the Commonwealth, including an investigation into alleged Japanese war crimes. 62 This led, after the Japanese surrender, to his appointment by General Douglas MacArthur as President of 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 63 Since the Tokyo trials were not concluded until late 1948, Webb -in another 'special' situation -was largely absent from Australia for the first two years of his tenure as a High Court judge. 64 
IV DOES WAR JUSTIFY 'SPECIAL CASES'?
This analysis of the Latham-Menzies fall of Britain exchange and of the collective features of the High Court's wider extra-judicial contribution to victory in World War II raises the question whether war does indeed justify such significant departures from ordinary standards of judicial independence and separation of powers. This question presents itself in acute form in the case of an apex court, like the High Court of Australia, with its unique legal responsibilities, especially in relation to the Constitution. 65 The remainder of this essay explores this important, though littlediscussed, matter.
A Role of changing standards One response to the question whether war justifies 'special cases' of extra-judicial service might be to suggest that it is only by applying contemporary standards to past events, such as those described above, that a perceived constitutional problem emerges. Justice J B Thomas in Judicial Ethics in Australia, for example, argues that as the result of a range of factors, including 'the increased politicisation of society', 66 the expectation that serving judges will distance themselves from governmental and political affairs is now stronger than it was just 50 years ago. 67 This assessment is consistent with developments over the same period which have seen the High Court take an increasingly strict approach to the doctrine of separation of powers contained in the Australian Constitution. 68 In particular, the Court's decision in 1996 in Wilson's Case 69 makes it clear that the appointment of a serving High Court judge to, for example, an ambassadorial post, would today be invalid as contrary to the separation doctrine. 70 In the tranquil conditions of the 1990s, the majority in Wilson's Case did not consider whether war or a similar emergency would justify any loosening of this stricture. 71 Shifting standards, however, provide only part of the answer. Were it not for the war, the nature and scale of High Court extra-judicial service during the early 1940s would have been unthinkable, even then. The evidence to this effect is considerable. Only a few years before the war, Dixon refused a request from Menzies -then Commonwealth Attorney-General -to conduct a Royal Commission on Banking and ____________________________________________________________________________________ Finance, claiming it would be incompatible with his role as a judge. 72 More tellingly, only a decade after the war, Dixon observed, in a surprisingly candid public confession, that 'in retrospect' he did not 'altogether approve' of his wartime extrajudicial activity. 73 If Latham had similar belated misgivings about his wartime conduct, however, he kept them to himself. 74 Even in the midst of the war there were signs that the High Court was stretching constitutional principle, possibly to breaking point. Following the announcement of Latham's appointment as Minister to Japan, an editorial in The Canberra Times argued that, in the interests of judicial independence, he should first resign as Chief Justice. 75 The Sydney Morning Herald, by contrast, strongly supported Latham's temporary move into the executive. Nonetheless it felt constrained to point out that there was a 'precedent' for Latham's 'leave of absence' from the High Court in Lord Chief Justice Reading's service during World War I as a British diplomat to the United States. 76 When Parliament amended the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in 1940, and again in 1942, to provide for Latham and Dixon's overseas postings, the government maintained on each occasion that the judge's secondment to non-judicial work was 'a wartime measure'. 77 This did not prevent some Members of Parliament from expressing concern, however, at the threat the appointments posed to judicial independence. 78 Most directly, and as already discussed, in his fall of Britain correspondence with Menzies, Latham recognised that '[i]n normal times', the offices of Chief Justice and Cabinet decision-maker would be fundamentally incompatible. 79
B
'Special Cases' and their limits It seems, therefore, that there was a widespread, though not necessarily universal, view in 1939-45 that the war had modified the principles of judicial independence and separation of powers, at least to some extent. 80 As a matter of law, this shift was certainly possible. Neither principle is a constitutional absolute and both have shown themselves capable, in varying contexts, of accommodating other societal interests and _____________________________________________________________________________________ 72 Ayres, above n 4, 62-3, 70. See also Ayres, above n 4, 117.
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ needs. The position of military tribunals in Australia provides a relevant example. While under the Constitution, federal judicial power must ordinarily be exercised by independent courts, it has long been accepted that for historical and practical reasons, bodies that do not meet normal standards of judicial autonomy can conduct trials of certain military offences, notably in times of conflict. 81 The Constitution also adapts to the imperatives of war in other respects. The Commonwealth's defence power, for example, expands during total war to, in effect, eclipse the federal division of powers. 82 In terms of general principles of judicial independence, it is relevant that a body like the Supreme Court of Victoria -which has traditionally opposed the use of its judges for non-judicial work -has recognised that a 'matter of national importance arising in times of national emergencies' may justify a different view. 83 Accepting then that war can blunt the full effect of judicial independence and separation of powers, does it follow that the High Court's extra-judicial activity during World War II was legitimate when assessed against relevant constitutional standards, past and present? Unless war dissolves the separation of powers entirely -an unlikely proposition 84 -the answer depends on the extent to which, in any particular case, the demands of war override the ordinary divisions between the judiciary and the other branches of government. Yet, given the nature of the conflicting values involved, different minds will almost inevitably disagree over the point at which judicial independence 'give[s] way' to defence need. 85 87 A further difficulty in determining the limits of 'special cases' of extra-judicial service by High Court judges flows from the fact that judicial independence and separation of powers have traditionally been given much of their content in Australia by our leading judges. Thus, if members of the High Court agree to serve as wartime diplomats or to undertake a secret defence inquiry, by what measure is this contrary to law or convention when the Court is the main arbiter of constitutional validity and has a vital role in modelling standards of professional behaviour for all Australian judges? 88 It is true that High Court judges make decisions in their judicial capacity, notably on Chapter III of the Constitution, that affect their own institutional position and in which there may be an unavoidable 'sense' that they 'are acting as judges in their own case'. 89 However, such decisions are made after argument in open court and are explained in written reasons. In contrast, a decision by a member of the Court, arrived at in consultation with the executive, that war justifies their service in a role that normally would be regarded as incompatible with judicial office, is invariably made in private and without published reasons. It is also unlikely, especially in wartime, to be subject to legal challenge. 90 In short, there is a risk of a self-legitimating cycle by which High Court judges produce shifts in the constitutional landscape, which in turn produce their own normative consequences, without exposure to the usual mechanisms of judicial accountability. Had Britain fallen to Germany in 1940 and had Latham publicly joined with Cabinet to consider transferring Australia's allegiance from Britain to the United States, he would have been neither politically nor, for all practical purposes, legally accountable for his assessment that war had so diluted the separation of powers that he could, with propriety, take this radical step. The same can be said of the extrajudicial work actually undertaken by members of the High Court in this period. It could be argued that because these judges were nominally entering executive service in their personal -as opposed to their judicial -capacity, 91 their assessment of constitutional 'rights' and 'wrongs' carried no more weight than for any other Any suggestion that not all members of the Court had supported the decision of a particular judge to engage in non-judicial work might help prompt a legal challenge, though the converse would doubtless have a dampening effect on litigious fervour.
91
On the so-called 'designated person' doctrine, see Wheeler, above n 43.
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ individual. But that flies in the face of reality and, pushed to its logical conclusion, could justify any venture by a High Court judge into the other branches of government.
V 'PARACHUTING IN' V REMAINING ON THE BENCH
These considerations -of which members of the High Court in World War II could not have been unaware -suggest that considerable caution is required before a High Court judge 'parachutes in' to a 'special case' of wartime extra-judicial activity, rather than continuing to serve the nation throughout the conflict from the bench. 92 The High Court, functioning as a court, has continued to play a crucial role in national life amidst Australia's most intense battlefield struggles. Kingdom. This simple fact -that leadership in the discharge of the functions of the third branch of government is required in both peace and war -underscores the need for restraint on the part of individual High Court judges before deciding to make a contribution to the war effort that would breach (or arguably breach) normal standards of judicial independence and propriety. 99 Moreover, judicial absences from the bench due to extra-judicial work are not trivial -had Dixon sat on the First Uniform Tax Case in 1942, rather than serving abroad, it could have been differently decided. 100 In this context, there is a shadow over much of the High Court's World War II extra-judicial activity and should have been, even then. Diplomatic appointments that take High Court judges away from the bench to the heart of executive power for lengthy periods must be suspect. Such a judge sheds their independence from government for executive skin. Only compelling wartime necessity could justify this. Yet it is hard to see that it was essential that Dixon, as opposed to someone else, should have been Australia's wartime representative in the United States, 101 though a stronger _____________________________________________________________________________________ 92
